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1. Perspectival Realism
Perspectival realism1 is best described as a cluster of views in philosophy of science
committed to both the existence ofmind-independent things and to the historical and
cultural situatedness of scientific knowledge (Massimi 2018a). The first is the realist
commitment, whilst the latter is the perspectivalist commitment. Perspectival realists
react against both objective realism and social constructivism. Perspectival realists
take issue with the objective realists’ tendency to formulate complete and objectively
true images of the world. For example, for the objectivist realist, scientific claims
such as ‘HIV is a virus that damages the immune system’, ‘Whales are mammals’ or
‘The electron has spin half’ are objectively true claims about the mind-independent
world. From the perspectival realist’s viewpoint, such claims, though they are about
mind-independent entities such as HIV, whales, and electrons, cannot be objectively
true, but only perspectively true. That is, such claims can be “relative to a per-
spective” (Giere 2006b, 81), “guides to an independently operating world” (Teller
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1In contemporary philosophy perspectivism has been advocated in connection to causation (Price
(2007), Ismael (2016)), mechanistic causation and explanation (Craver (2013), Dewhurst (2018),
Kastner (2018), Winning (2018)), time (Baron and Evans (2019), Rovelli (2017), Torrengo (2017)),
meta-ethics (Schafer 2014), peer disagreement (Kvanvig 2013), justification (Sosa (1991) and Rosen-
berg (2002)), contextualism and relativism in philosophy of language (Bach 2011), and issues of
realism in philosophy of science. In this paper the focus is on perspectival realism (Giere (2006a),
Teller (2011), Massimi (2018a), etc.) and not on perspectivism broadly construed. Since debates in
other areas of contemporary philosophy are orthogonal to our focus, they shall, with few exceptions,
be bracketed in what follows.
1
2 ANA-MARIA CRET¸U
2011, 471), or “true across scientific perspectives” (Massimi 2018a, 357), but not true
simpliciter. Thus, the perspectival realist denies the epistemological commitment of
the objectivist realist according to which the scientific enterprise can produce an
ultimate, objectively true picture of the world.
Perspectival realists also take issue with the social constructivists portrayal of sci-
ence as the product of social interactions and institutions and not as the product
of interactions with a mind-independent world. Though perspectival realists admit
that science is subject to some degree of contingency, they are also committed to
mind-independent things. Cashing out the nature of this commitment is one of the
main problems of perspectival realism. Perspectival realists share with social con-
structivists the commitment to epistemic pluralism, the idea that there are multiple
ways of acquiring knowledge about the world and multiple di↵erent descriptions of
mind-independent entities, none of which are objectively true. The commitment to
epistemic pluralism seems to be incompatible with the realist commitment, a tension
which will be explored in subsequent sections.
It will however prove instructive to explore the origins of perspectival realism first.
Giere (2006b)’s first formulation of perspectival realism takes lessons from colour
vision to extend to scientific practice in general, in particular to modelling prac-
tices. Giere takes di↵erent systems of vision to amount to di↵erent, yet compatible
perspectives on the world. The dichromate and the trichromat experience the world
in di↵erent ways, but it cannot be said that the dichromate’s experience is veridi-
cal whereas the trichromat’s is not. Furthermore, just as di↵erent systems of vision
constitute di↵erent perspectives on the world so do di↵erent scientific models of the
same target system. Moreover, since disagreement can only occur within the same
perspective and models constitute di↵erent perspectives, they cannot disagree, so we
should think of them as being compatible. However, since certain modelling practices
feature genuinely incompatible models which block realist inferences about phenom-
ena, Giere’s lessons from the visual metaphor cannot be easily extended to modelling
practices. Besides the challenge from incompatible models, the visual metaphor has
also been criticised by Brown (2009) and Chirimuuta (2016).
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The visual metaphor perpetuates a misleading “model of knowledge seeking”
(Chirimuuta 2016, 754) as “the picturing of objective facts” (id.), which is “ulti-
mately a passive activity” (Brown 2009, p. 219), incompatible with the practice
of science. Scientific practices such as modelling, where the role of the agents and
their purposes are pivotal to the process of representation, are better fashioned after
a haptic metaphor. Whereas the visual metaphor promotes a “spectator theory of
knowledge” (Brown 2009, p. 219), the haptic metaphor promotes an idea congenial
to science according to which we learn about the world “through tinkering and in-
teracting with it” (Chirimuuta 2016, 755). Whilst more appropriate than the visual
metaphor, the haptic metaphor is nevertheless limited. For example, it cannot ap-
ply to astrophysics and cosmology, where direct interaction and tinkering with the
objects of investigation is not possible.
Having assessed the initial plausibility of the visual metaphor as a springboard for
perspectival realism, let us now turn to two main arguments for perspectival realism
derived from scientific practice.2
2. Two Arguments
2.1. The Synchronic Argument from Modelling Practices. The first argu-
ment in favour of perspectival realism, call it the synchronic argument, is derived
from contemporary scientific practices, in particular from modelling practices (Giere
2006b). We can formulate the argument from modelling practices either i) in terms
of the knowledge that can be retrieved about the world from modelling practices, or
ii) in terms of the claims about the world warranted by the use of instruments.
The first formulation goes as follows:
P1. Diverse modelling practices are ubiquitous in contemporary scientific
practice.
P2. Diverse modelling practices often give rise to multiple, di↵erent models
of the same target system.
P3. Di↵erent models constitute partial perspectives regarding the same target
system.
2Massimi (2018c) was the first to distinguish between a synchronic version and a diachronic version
of perspectivism.
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P4. Knowledge obtained through partial perspectives regarding the same tar-
get system is inherently perspectival.
C. Therefore, modelling practices yield partial and perspectival knowledge
about the world.
Focussing on the kind of knowledge that can be yielded by instruments, perspec-
tival realists insist, once more, that such knowledge is inherently perspectival. Here
is how the second formulation of the argument goes:
P1. We use instruments to learn about the world.
P2. Instruments are sensitive to certain inputs, but not others and are thus
not transparent.
P3. Since instruments are not transparent, the claims warranted by the use
of instruments are partial and perspectival.
C. Hence, instruments yield partial and perspectival knowledge about the
world.
Modelling practices and the instruments used to investigate the world can only
give us a limited and fragmented image of the world and never a complete and ob-
jectively true picture of the world. Yet, through modelling practices and instruments
we interact with a mind-independent world and thus science studies the interac-
tions between our modelling practices and instruments and the world and not the
interactions between social interactions and institutions.
2.2. The Diachronic Argument from History of Science. The second argu-
ment for perspectival realism is derived from the history of science. It is another
epistemic argument aimed to refute the claim that science o↵ers complete and objec-
tively true images of the world. Let us call it the diachronic argument. The structure
of the diachronic argument is as follows:
P1. Once we reflect on the succession of past scientific theories we are led to
the conclusion that although many past theories proved to be false, some at
least, got something right about the world.
P2. Since many such theories have been abandoned, yet some claims were
retained, it cannot be the case that science gives us true and complete images
of the world.
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P3. Instead, what history of science teaches us is that there are multiple
di↵erent perspectives regarding the same phenomena.
C. Thus, history of science yields perspectival knowledge of the world.
Di↵erent perspectives on the same phenomena are particularly important also be-
cause they enable di↵erent justifications for scientific claims about the world. Mas-
simi (2012), for example, argues that although scientists’ beliefs about the world are
motivated by things in the world, such beliefs must also fit into a scientist’s epis-
temic perspective. Knowing the epistemic conditions under which scientists can gain
knowledge of nature’s fundamental properties is as important as employing the rele-
vant detection procedures for gaining access to such properties. For example, we can
know that J.J. Thompson discovered the electron because we can know the epistemic
conditions under which he gained knowledge of electrons, even though he did not call
them electrons. Hence, the realist can only benefit from incorporating an account of
perspectival justification in any story about how knowledge of the world is acquired.
Wol↵ (2018) makes a similar recommendation for the (structural) realist. Wol↵ ar-
gues that whilst the representational theory of measurement can be seen as a form
of structural realism, in order to justify the attribution of measurement structures to
particular attributes, it must be supplemented with Massimi’s epistemic perspectival
realism.
To judge the viability of perspectival realism as a novel alternative to realism,
both its perspectivalist and its realist commitments must withstand scrutiny. How-
ever, whilst the commitment to the perspectival nature of knowledge is supported by
a synchronic and a diachronic argument, the commitment to realism is more prob-
lematic. In fact, perspectival realism can be challenged on precisely this point: its
commitment to realism seems at best insubstantial and at worst entirely lacking.
3. Two Challenges
3.1. The Realism Challenge. One of the main challenges to perspectival realism is
the Incompatible Models Argument (IMA) (Chakravartty (2010), Morrison (2011)).
The main idea behind IMA is that pluralism about perspectival modelling is in-
compatible with perspectival realism. Pluralism here refers to the observation that
in scientific practice many di↵erent models are often employed for the same target
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system. Whilst in many cases di↵erent models complement one another sometimes
di↵erent models are inconsistent with one another. Since inconsistent models can at-
tribute contradicting properties to the same target system it can be di cult to specify
the nature of the physical system modelled. Thus, IMA challenges the perspectival
realist’s commitment to realism. The argument has the following structure:
P1. Incompatible models of the same target system are used by scientists for
predictive purposes.
P2. These models ascribe di↵erent properties to the same target system and
thus appear to contradict each other.
P3. The predictive success of a theory is taken by realists as an indication of
the theory’s approximate truth.
P4. However, if several theories of the same system are predictively successful
and if these theories are mutually inconsistent, they cannot all be true, not
even approximately (Frigg and Hartmann (2018, p. 29)).
C. Thus, incompatible models cannot yield a realist commitment to the same
target system.
There are two di↵erent perspectivalist responses to IMA. According to the first
response, each of a number of di↵erent models of the same target system reveals one
particular aspect of the relevant phenomenon. When models are taken together, a
fuller, yet di↵erent perspective regarding the target system emerges. Let’s call this
the Giere-Rueger response (Giere (2006b), Rueger (2005)). According to the Giere-
Rueger response, incompatible models do not yield ultimate or even approximate
truths about the phenomenon, but they do yield perspectival knowledge of the phe-
nomenon. A compelling example is provided by Plutynski (2018), who argues that
cancer theories, due to the complexity of their object of investigation, can only yield
partial and perspectival knowledge. Cancer theories, according to Plutynski, are not
in conflict with one another.
The Giere-Rueger response to IMA has been challenged by Chakravartty (2010)
and Morrison (2011). Morrison argues that “perspectivism is simply a re-branded
version of instrumentalism” (Morrison 2011, p. 350). Looking at modelling practices
concerning the structure of the nucleus, Morrison shows that inconsistent models
do not yield knowledge of fundamental aspects of the target system, and thus any
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realist inference based on IMA is unsubstantiated. According to Morrison there are
at least 30 di↵erent models of the nucleus, each making very di↵erent assumptions
about the same target system. Di↵erent models ascribe di↵erent types of behaviours
to the nucleons leading to incompatible characterisations of its nature. For example
the incompatibility of the di↵erent models makes it di cult to determine if they
are probability waves, point particles or space-occupying objects. Although each of
these models is predictively and explanatorily successful in a given domain, there
is no way to “build on and extend the models in a cumulative way” (p. 351) so
as to approximate the true nature of the nucleus. If the di↵erent models cannot be
cumulated because they attribute contradictory properties to the same target system,
the success of the models cannot be taken to indicate their approximate truth. Thus
the Giere-Rueger response fails to secure even a weak realist commitment.
A second response to IMA comes from Massimi (2018b), who argues that IMA
relies on “unduly demanding and ultimately inadequate” (Massimi 2018b, p. 14)
premisses that cannot “carry the full argumentative weight for IMA” (id.). Massimi
is responding primarily to Chakravartty (2010), who sees IMA as incompatible with
perspectival realism, but not with dispositional realism. Chakravartty argues that
di↵erent modelling practices may appear to ascribe contradictory properties to the
same target system, but contradictions can be explained away once the dispositional
behaviour of non-perspectival physical systems is understood. However, the role of
dispositions is highly disputed in science and the examples that Chakravartty o↵ers
(such as the solubility of salt) are a long way short of constituting a response to
genuine cases of inconsistent scientific models, such as those o↵ered by Morrison.
Furthermore, by not showing how knowledge of dispositional facts is acquired the
dispositional realist ends up relying on a form of epistemic bootstrapping (Mas-
simi 2012). Massimi points out that the dispositional realist’s commitment to non-
perspectival facts relies on the possibility of acquiring relevant knowledge about such
facts. Yet, the dispositional realist does not o↵er a compelling story regarding how
knowledge of dispositional facts is acquired. For example, the dispositional realist
fails to justify how we come to know that salt is indeed soluble. Since the realist
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commitment is dependent on such knowledge, which would explain away the ap-
pearance of incompatible models, the dispositional realist cannot claim to secure a
commitment to dispositional facts.
The perspectival realist, unlike the dispositional realist, can explain how we acquire
knowledge of the world (Massimi 2012). By knowing the epistemic perspective of past
scientists we can know what justified their claims. Furthermore, by comparing past
systems of knowledge with our current scientific knowledge we can assess which of the
surviving claims are still supported by empirical evidence. Thus we can ascertain the
progress made in learning about particular entities by tracking the ongoing empirical
support of surviving justified claims of past scientists. For example, once we take into
account the di↵erent perspectival images of the electron produced by J.J. Thomson,
P.A.M. Dirac, and modern quantum electrodynamics we can know what can be said
about the electron and ascertain the progress made since J.J. Thomson’s discovery.
Hence, the perspectival realist tackles IMA by explaining how di↵erent epistemic
perspectives may nevertheless yield knowledge about the same entities.
3.2. The Relativism Challenge. Another main challenge to perspectival realism
is the relativist challenge. If modelling practices and lessons from history of science
can only yield perspectival knowledge then all scientific knowledge is knowledge from
within a perspective. If all knowledge is perspectival, can we have any knowledge of
non-perspectival facts? Can we know any truths about the world?
A number of di↵erent a rmative responses are available. According to Teller
(2011), a novel conception of truth which is appropriate for modelling practices is
needed. Models are idealisations and because the world is too complex, they can-
not be accurate. At the same time, accurate, but imprecise statements cannot be
true. Thus, whilst models cannot deliver traditional truths, neither can imprecise
non-idealised statements about the world. But since models yield knowledge of the
world, Teller suggests we understand truth in connection to modelling practices in
terms of semantic alter-egos. What this means is that a pair of sentences, one which
is precise and true, but inaccurate, together with its imprecise, but accurate seman-
tic alter-ego can jointly be used to make true claims about the world. An imprecise
statement counts as true in virtue of being the semantic alter-ego of a precise, but
inaccurate statement. Although models cannot tell us precisely what the nature of
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the target system is, models, in “in many fortunate cases, function as accurate guides
to an independently operating world” (Teller 2011, p. 471).
Teller’s response, whilst prima facie appealing, cannot deliver on the normativity
of realism (Massimi 2018a). According to Massimi, science, by realist lights, ought to
get things right (p. 4). Since perspectival realism shares with scientific realism this
normative commitment to get things right, perspectival truth can be “neither truth
indexed to a scientific perspective [a la Teller], nor truth relative to a perspective [a
la Giere]” (p. 2). Instead, perspectival truth is truth across perspectives, with the
following caveats: i) no perspective can sanction its own truth; ii) any truth claim
must meet certain standards of performance adequacy common across perspectives
(Massimi 2018a; Massimi 2018c). Thus, perspectival truth claims are the result of
“cross-perspectival agreement on the ongoing performance-adequacy of knowledge
claims” (p. 17). Accuracy, empirical testability, projectibility, and heuristic fruit-
fulness are examples of standards of performance adequacy that Massimi envisages
to be common across perspectives. Since perspectival truth, on Massimi’s proposal,
tracks mind-independent facts across perspectives, perspectival realism can be taken
to provide a safeguard against truth relativism.
There are, however, some problems with this proposal. Whilst cross-perspectival
evaluation may be possible in the context of synchronic modelling practices, it is
not clear how cross-perspectival evaluation would work for diachronic practices. This
is because even if standards of performance adequacy of diachronic practices can
be successfully recovered or rationally reconstructed, the ultimate verdict regarding
ongoing performance-adequacy of knowledge claims is still provided from within the
current vantage point. Whilst judging past systems of knowledge with the benefit of
hindsight may not lead to truth relativism, it certainly makes perspectival realism
vulnerable to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), a charge famously raised by Lau-
dan (1981) against scientific realism. In brief, PMI challenges the realists’ strategy
to infer truth from the success of a theory. Laudan notes that there have been many
successful theories, for example Dirac’s hole theory (Pashby 2012) or Fresnel’s theory
of light and the luminiferous ether, which have nevertheless been abandoned, and
thus, one cannot infer the truth of a theory from its success. Similarly, one cannot
infer a theory’s truth from the ongoing success of its accuracy, empirical testability,
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projectibility, and heuristic fruitfulness. At best, one might infer the theory’s empiri-
cal adequacy (Van Fraassen 1980; Van Fraassen 2010) and suspend judgement on its
truth or approximate truth, thus adopting a form of constructive empiricism along
the way. Thus, as it stands, perspectival realism fares considerably worse than its
rivals (constructivism empiricism, and arguably also structural realism) as a means
of responding to historical case studies that motivate the PMI.
4. Conclusion
To sum up, perspectival realism is a view in philosophy of science according to
which two seemingly incompatible commitments can be reconciled: the commitment
to a mind-independent world and the commitment to the situatedness of scientific
knowledge. The commitment to the situatedness of knowledge, shared with con-
structivists, is supported through arguments from contemporary scientific modelling
practices and through lessons from the history of science. The commitment to a
mind-independent world, shared with realists, remains largely unsupported. Future
e↵orts should be directed towards a renewed defence of the realist commitment to a
mind-independent world.
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